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     * The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No:  04-3883
DARLENA MEYERS, Administratrix of the Estate of Timothy Meyers, Deceased
       v.
DUSHAN MAJKIC, M.D.; ALLEGHENY CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES,
INC.; THOMAS FLAUGHERTY; ALLEGHENY COUNTY; AND CALVIN
LIGHTFOOT
Thomas Flaherty,
           Appellant.
Appeal from that Portion of the Memorandum Order dated September 27, 2004 of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania which denied
Thomas Flaherty’s Claim of Qualified Immunity
(Civ. No. 02-1543)
District Court: Hon. Joy Flowers Conti
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 27, 2006
 
Before: McKEE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges,
and POLLAK*, District Judge.
(Filed: July 24, 2006)
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Thomas Flaherty, a Corrections Officer at Allegheny County Jail, appeals the
     1 Although not a “final order,” we have jurisdiction to review a denial of a claim for
qualified immunity under the collateral order doctrine.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
524-25 (1985)(quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan, Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949))(internal quotation marks omitted). Our review is plenary.  Wright v. City of
Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 599 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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District Court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment based upon a claim of
qualified immunity.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.1
I.
Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this
case, we need not recite the factual or procedural background of this dispute.
In considering a claim of qualified immunity, we must first consider whether the
facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party claiming the injury,
demonstrate that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.  Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington,
PA, 316 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2003).  If no constitutional right would have been violated
under the facts alleged by the plaintiff, our inquiry is at an end and the defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity.   Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.  If a constitutional right may
have been violated by the actions alleged, the defendant is only entitled to qualified
immunity if the right was not clearly established.  Id.; see also United Artists Theater
Circuit, Inc., 316 F.3d at 398.  A right is clearly established if it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his/her conduct was unlawful in the specific context of the case. 
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204.   
     2 It appears from this record that Meyers was being held as a pretrial detainee, rather
than a convicted prisoner. Accordingly, his claim arises under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s  Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005).   The cases
relied upon by the Magistrate Judge and District Court were decided under the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, not the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process. However, the distinction does not alter our
analysis. The standard for violations of the Eighth Amendment applies to pretrial
detainees through the Due Process Clause. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 188 (3d. Cir.
1993). 
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II.
It is now well established that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs
of a prisoner can rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).2  A prisoner’s medical need is serious when it “has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or is so obvious that a layperson would
recognize the need for professional medical care.  Monmouth County  Correctional
Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 826, 846 (3d Cir. 1987).  A plaintiff can
establish deliberate indifference when the record would allow the fact finder to conclude
that a prison official is subjectively aware of the risk of substantial harm to an inmate, but
failed to respond.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1970).  
Officer Flaherty testified at the inquest that he knew that Meyers had fallen and
that he (Flaherty) assumed that the cleaning materials Meyers requested were to clean the
blood from Meyers’ cell. A.4.  Two years later, at his deposition, Flaherty claimed that he
assumed Meyers wanted the materials to mop water from his cell. Nevertheless, he also
testified during that deposition that he would have called medical personnel if he had
4known that Meyers wanted to mop up blood. Id.  As the Magistrate Judge notes in her
Report and Recommendation, a fact finder could therefore readily conclude that “there
was a lot of whatever substance Meyers was going to clean up to require the supplies
Anderson brought to Meyers’ cell.” App. 21. The Magistrate Judge recognized that this
“would have placed Flaherty on notice that something was seriously wrong with Meyers.”
Id.
There is also testimony that Shon Ellis, a fellow inmate, told Flaherty that Meyers
asked to go to the infirmary in the afternoon of May 26, and that Flaherty responded: “F 
him. I asked him earlier did he want to go to medical and he refused so I’m not sending
him no where now. . . .” Id., at 6.  That testimony, combined with Flaherty’s own
testimony that Ellis did not tell him anything he didn’t already know during that
conversation, could allow a jury to conclude that Flaherty knew that Meyers had injured
his head to such an extent that he needed a mop and bucket to clean up all of the blood.
Yet, when informed that Meyers wanted medical attention, Flaherty’s only response was
“F him . . . I’m not sending him nowhere now.” 
In her thoughtful Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge explained as
follows in recommending that the District Court deny Flaherty’s claim of qualified
immunity:
Meyers’ constitutional right to medical care for a serious
medical need while incarcerated was clearly established at the
time of Flaherty’s alleged conduct. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
Hence, the key inquiry for purposes of qualified immunity is
5whether Flaherty’s conduct was objectively reasonable; that
is; whether a reasonable corrections officer in Flaherty’s
situation could have believed that his conduct comported with
established legal standards. Plaintiff has raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Flaherty was deliberately
indifferent to Meyers’ serious medical needs. Consequently, a
reasonable corrections officer could not believe that his
actions comported with clearly established law while also
believing that there was an excessive risk to Meyers and
failing to adequately respond to that risk. Because there is a
genuine issue of fact as to whether Flaherty was deliberately
indifferent, he has not carried his burden to establish that he is
entitled to qualified immunity. See Carter v. City of
Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
if plaintiff succeeds in establishing defendants acted with
deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights, then
defendant’s conduct was not objectively reasonable and
qualified immunity defense is not available).
App. 25.
Of course, this record contains additional accusations and denials, as well as issues
of causation.  However,  we need not explore them in order to resolve the one issue raised
in Officer Flaherty’s appeal.  Given the Magistrate Judge’s thoughtful analysis of the
issue before us, nothing more needs to be said. 
 III.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying summary judgment
to Corrections Officer Flaherty on his claim of qualified immunity.
